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EconoScope | Hoshine case puts U.S. forced-labor enforcement to the test_我的网站

A |     (ECNS) -- U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies over alleged “forced labor” are facing growing scrutiny, both over the facts behind such accusations and the legal procedures used to enforce them.    Recently, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), under the Department of Homeland Security, updated its records to remove Hoshine Silicon (Jia Xing) Co., Ltd., a Chinese photovoltaic supply-chain company, from the scope of a Withhold Release Order (WRO) related to alleged forced labor in Xinjiang.        Li Guogang, senior legal counsel at Tahota Law Firm who represented Hoshine Silicon, told China News Network that this is the first known case of a Chinese company being removed from the scope of such a U.S. enforcement measure related to Xinjiang. He described it as a milestone for Chinese companies seeking to challenge U.S. actions involving alleged forced labor.    From being targeted to having to prove its innocence    In recent years, the U.S. has repeatedly used WROs and Xinjiang-related legislation to impose trade restrictions on Chinese companies.    For businesses caught up in such enforcement measures, proving that their products and supply chains are not connected to alleged forced labor can become a major hurdle.    The Hoshine case highlights the difficult burden placed on companies facing such measures. Rather than authorities being required to disclose the full basis for their allegations through a transparent process, affected companies may find themselves having to submit extensive evidence to demonstrate that the accusations against them are unfounded.    “We submitted 4,000 to 5,000 pages of materials, including audit results and detailed explanations of the supply chain, to demonstrate that the allegations of forced labor against Hoshine Silicon were without factual basis,” Li said.    The company’s experience also shows how difficult it can be for businesses to challenge such enforcement actions. According to Li, U.S. customs authorities initially rejected Hoshine Silicon’s applications for removal twice.    The situation changed after the company took the case to the U.S. Court of International Trade. The dispute subsequently moved through judicial proceedings, and the enforcement measure was eventually lifted as it applied to Hoshine Silicon.    The shift from administrative enforcement to judicial review is significant. It shows that when allegations lack sufficient factual support, legal procedures can still provide companies with an important avenue to seek relief and challenge government decisions.    The significance goes beyond one company    The significance of the Hoshine case lies in more than one company being removed from the scope of a U.S. trade restriction.    In recent years, U.S. restrictions on Chinese companies have expanded far beyond traditional tariffs, extending into supply chains, investment, technology and national security. Issues involving Xinjiang and alleged military ties have also increasingly become part of Washington’s economic policy toolkit toward China.    One direct result is greater uncertainty for Chinese companies seeking to enter or operate in the U.S. market. Businesses must consider not only product prices, quality and competitiveness, but also the additional risks created by shifts in U.S. domestic politics and regulatory policy.    China’s Ministry of Commerce has repeatedly stated that Xinjiang enjoys social stability, economic development and improving living standards, and that there is no forced labor of any kind in the region.    A recent case involving Chinese pharmaceutical and life-sciences company WuXi AppTec offers another example worth watching. The company has also challenged its designation by the U.S. Department of Defense as a “Chinese military company.”    A U.S. court recently granted WuXi AppTec a preliminary injunction, temporarily blocking the designation while the case proceeds. The court found that the company was likely to succeed in arguing that the Defense Department’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, pointing to problems in how some of the evidence had been interpreted.    From Xinjiang-related restrictions to military-related designations, the U.S. government has increasingly brought political and national-security considerations into its treatment of Chinese companies.    When political tools are repeatedly used to blacklist Chinese businesses, the consequences go beyond the outcome of a single lawsuit. They can also affect global companies’ confidence in the predictability of the U.S. market and its legal and regulatory environment.    If companies must spend enormous amounts of time and money simply to demonstrate that allegations against them lack sufficient evidence, questions inevitably arise over whether confidence in U.S. market rules and legal institutions can be sustained.    Commercial rules ultimately depend on institutions that are stable, transparent and predictable.    When administrative power increasingly intervenes in normal international trade, and when market risks depend more heavily on political judgments, the impact extends beyond one company or one supply chain. It can shape global businesses’ long-term expectations of the stability and reliability of the U.S. market.    The cases of Hoshine Silicon and WuXi AppTec have therefore opened more than a gap in individual blacklists. They have exposed a potential crack in the broader machinery of U.S. sanctions and restrictions.    When allegations fail to withstand legal scrutiny and enforcement actions lack sufficient factual support, the credibility of those measures inevitably comes into question.    For Chinese companies, the message from these cases is clear: being placed under a U.S. restriction does not necessarily mark the end of the story. Evidence, legal procedures and judicial review can still challenge administrative decisions — and, in doing so, expose weaknesses in U.S. enforcement actions driven more by political considerations than by solid evidence.    (By Gong Weiwei)                            。

B |     
在与其他人交流后，他发现其他数码 UP 主也注意到了类似的情况。出现问题的手机覆盖范围很广，从古早的三星 Galaxy S4 ，一直到相当近的 Galaxy S20 FE 甚至是Z Fold 2 ，都有出现问题。他说，自己在公开曝光这件事之前，已经等了 50 天，然而三星一直没有给出回复。
一直到视频发出半个月后，三星终于给出了啥也没给的回复：得知这件事的托尼立刻进行了一次身边统计学，结果出人意料，又在情理之中：情理之中的是，整个编辑部能找到的三星手机加起来少于 5 部。你说这图和三星无关？无关就对了……▼
而意料之外的是，在抽屉里长期储存的那些三星手机，都没有出现那位 UP 主描述中的鼓包现象。不过上微博转了一圈，托尼发现在事件发酵前， 就已经有不少中国用户反映三星的电池容易鼓包了：


由于这次“ 电池门 ”涉及到的型号和生产时间跨度太大，托尼认为这事不太像是品控或电池厂商问题，更有可能是三星的某种系统性失误。而这个失误， 最先让人想到的就是三星的电池选型。

C | 在 Note7 成为哑火手雷之后，三星痛定思痛，决定改用不太可能起火的凝胶电池。在此之前，市场上只有索尼采用这种电池。大多数手机电池用的是 液态电解质的 锂离子电池，也就是说，电池内部有很多流动性不错的有机液体。这种有机溶液一旦碰到高温（ 比如电池短路 ）或水蒸气就会分解，产生大量气体。一旦电池包装被气体吹爆或是被外部刺穿，电解液就会流出电池，与空气大面积接触，造成起火。而凝胶电池的电解质类似于果冻，即使包装破裂，也不会有电解液流出，大大降低了起火几率。与一般锂离子电池相比，凝胶电池更安全，而且充放电时对电极的损耗更小，容量衰减慢。但凝胶电池生产工艺复杂，价格高；能量密度低，而且电池内阻大。

D | 这就导致凝胶电池既贵，容量又小，充电还慢，属于是完美地反向切中手机的续航痛点。因此，没有产品大“ 爆 ”过的手机厂商，一般不会选择凝胶电池。三星延续至今的 25W “ 快 ”充估计就有电池的因素 ▼
当然，凝胶电池作为一种三星特色，最容易让人怀疑与这次三星独占的“ 电池门 ”有关，但也不是三星电池鼓包的唯一可能原因。毕竟这次爆出的鼓包手机并不全都使用了凝胶电池，比如较早发布的三星 Galaxy S4 和 S7 就是一般的锂离子电池。

E |
因此托尼同样怀疑，三星在电池管理方面有缺陷。这可能导致三星手机在长期关机的情况下，电池快速进入过放状态。现代手机关机后，主板上的某些元件可能仍然在工作。比如大多数手机都支持的关机闹钟和定时关机，就需要记录时间的芯片不断电。

F |
但如果三星的电池管理方案，不会在电池电量低的情况下完全切断主板电源，就会造成过度放电。过放会对电池造成相当严重的损伤。其中一个表现就是电解质在电极上分解，产生大量气体，进而导致鼓包。
当然，相比过度充电或电池内部短路造成的损伤，过放不太可能造成燃烧和爆炸，因为过放状态的电池，能量已经基本耗尽了。但无论是什么原因，鼓包的电池都不该重新充电，它的内部结构可能已经损坏，充电时说不定就会给你来一下狠的。这次三星电池门，从 Mrwhosetheboss 首次报告到现在已经过去两个半个月了，但三星依然没有给出一个有用的答复。虽说电池鼓包并不罕见，但让一群数码大 V 不得不公开质疑产品来为自己要个结果，三星这次无论是产品还是公关，都有不小的问题。还好这次电池不会突然烧起来，不然三星又要挨上一棒了。

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Published on:16:04:13